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A Potential Lesson from the Israeli Experience for the
American Same-Sex Marriage Debate
Shahar Lifshitz*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade American marriage law has been the arena for a
major controversy regarding same-sex marriage.1 Typically, liberals tend
to support same-sex marriage,2 while conservatives oppose it.3 The
liberal-conservative dispute concerning same-sex marriage is usually
related to a broader debate on the legitimacy of limiting the possibilities
for marrying. Liberals present marriage as a private arrangement between
the partners,4 and they therefore oppose restricting the right to marry
with classic liberal arguments about individual freedom, equality, and
privacy.5 The opponents of same-sex marriage, in contrast,6 seek to
*

Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Bar-Ilan University, Israel.
1. For the variety of the existing approaches, see the following symposiums: Symposium,
Breaking With Tradition: New Frontiers for Same- Sex Marriage, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 65
(2005); Symposium, Can Anyone Show Just Cause Why These Two Should Not Be Lawfully Joined
Together?, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 487 (2004); Same-Sex Marriage Symposium Issue, 18 BYU J.
PUB. L. 273 (2004); Symposium, Vermont Civil Unions, 25 VT. L. REV. 1 (2000).
2. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (The Free
Press 1996); Mark P. Strasser, “Defending” Marriage in Light of the Moreno-Cleburne-RomerLawrence Jurisprudence: Why DOMA Cannot Pass Muster after Lawrence, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV.
421 (2005); Mark Strasser, Marital Acts, Morality, and the Right to Privacy, 30 N.M. L. Rev. 43
(2000).
3. See, e.g., David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Definition or Discrimination?
State Marriage Recognition Statutes in the “Same-Sex Marriage” Debate, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 3
(1998); Lynn D. Wardle, ―Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of
State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 771 (2001). For the traditionoriented and even religious aspects of those opposing same sex-marriage, see Daniel Borrillo, Who is
Breaking with Tradition? The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnership in France and the
Question of Modernity, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 89 (2005).
4. See, e.g., Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443
(describing the decline in the role of marriage as a public institution as part of privatization process).
5. For marriage as a fundamental right, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) where
the Supreme Court recognized that the right of an individual to marry was encompassed in the term
―liberty‖ found in the Due Process Clause. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(analyzing the right to marry as part of the right to privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942) (the Supreme Court included the right to marry, as well as the right to procreate, as
fundamental rights under equal protection analysis). For a later application of the right to be married,
see Turner v. Salfi, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Wright v.
MetroHealth Med. Ctr., 58 F.3d 1130, 1134 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1158 (1996); see
also Cathy J. Jones, The Rights to Marry and Divorce: A New Look at some Unanswered Questions,
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justify proposed legal limits to the right to be married by presenting
marriage as a public institution.7
Based on the unique experience amassed in Israel regarding marriage
and cohabitation law, this Comment seeks to highlight the potential
consequences of the struggle between liberals and conservatives
regarding limitations on the right to marriage for an additional liberalconservative debate concerning the unique status of legal marriages.
The conservative position limiting entry to marriage won a decisive
victory in Israel. Accordingly, partners of the same-sex, like partners
from different religious communities, are not allowed to formally marry.
Generally speaking, the right to marry is subject to a broad range of civil
and religious restrictions.8 The strict limitations on the right to marry
helped trigger the development of cohabitation as a substitute for formal
marriage. Ironically, the array of rights and obligations of cohabitants is
approaching that of married partners, and at times even exceeds the
latter. This Comment will argue for the development of a similar
dynamic in the United States, where the distress of same-sex partners
serves as a motivator for proposals, for strengthening the institution of
cohabitation, for the weakening of the institution of marriage, and at
times, even for the abolishment of marriage as a legal institution.
In light of this developing dynamic and taking into account the
aggregate Israeli experience, this Comment will advance three
arguments. Part II will present a conservative critique of the conservative
position against same-sex partners. It will argue that the conservative
camp‘s relative success in limiting the possibility of same-sex marriages
harms this camp‘s broader agenda for the preference of legal marriages.
Part III will present a liberal critique of the liberal camp. This Comment
proposes that efforts by liberals to decrease the gap between legal
marriage and cohabitation, in many instances, harm the values of
freedom of choice and autonomy in the name of which they act. Finally,
Part IV will argue on behalf of democratic compromises such as civil

63 WASH. U. L. Q. 577 (1985). For an application of the general right to marriage of same-sex
couples, see, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep‟t of Pub. Health , 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Baker v.
Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Karen M. Loewy, The Unconstitutionality of Excluding SameSex Couples from Marriage, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 555, 560 (2004).
6. See Earl M. Maltz, Constitutional Protection for the Right to Marry: A Dissenting View,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 949 (1992) (supporting a narrow interpretation of the right to be married
which does not include same-sex marriage); Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2081 (2005); Lynn D. Wardle, Loving v. Virginia and the Constitutional Right to Marry,
1790–1990, 41 HOW. L.J. 289 (1998).
7. See, e.g., Don S. Browning, Linda McClain‟s The Place of Family and Contemporary
Family Law: A Critique from Critical Familism, 56 EMORY L.J. 1383, 1395–96 (2007); Coolidge &
Duncan, supra note 3; Wardle, supra note 3.
8. See infra Part II.A.
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union in the United States and spousal registry in Israel.
II. THE CONSERVATIVE PRICE OF THE CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION TO
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
This part uses the Israeli experience to reveal the potential
consequences of the struggle between liberals and conservatives
regarding limitations of the right to marriage.
A. The Israeli Marriage Law Experience
1. The religious dominance of marriage and divorce law
Israeli marriage and divorce law is strikingly irregular in the
landscape of Israeli law. Although the legal system in Israel is primarily
secular and liberal,9 marriage and divorce are adjudicated in religious
courts and are subject to religious law.10 The prime expression of the
religious character of Israeli family law is the fact that civil marriage and
civil divorce do not exist in Israel. Accordingly, persons who desire to
marry or divorce are obliged to do so in a religious ceremony even if
they hold no religious beliefs.
A particularly severe problem faces those who are not permitted to
marry under religious law, such as mixed-faith couples (adherents of
different religions); persons having no recognized religious affiliation;
persons ineligible to marry (in the case of Jews the most common
examples are a kohen [a member of the priestly class] and a divorcee);
and same-sex couples. The legal system in Israel does not offer these
couples any ―official‖ possibility of marrying each other.11 This state of
affairs has given rise to sharp criticism from a civilian point of view and
is certainly intolerable from a secular liberal perspective.12 It is not
surprising that from time to time the public discourse in Israel has
generated proposals for the establishment of civil marriages.13 However,
9. See Shahar Lifshitz, Secular Family Law in the Next Fifty Years—Classical Liberalism
Versus Communitarian Liberalism, 17 BAR-ILAN L. STUD. 159, 161 (2001).
10. For a comprehensive review of issues of jurisdiction and law in relation to personal
status, see ARIEL ROSEN-ZVI, FAMILY LAW IN ISRAEL – BETWEEN SACRED AND SECULAR 23–97
(1990); PINHAS SHIFMAN, FAMILY LAW IN ISRAEL 22–135 (2nd ed., 1995).
11. See RUTH HALPERIN KADDARI, WOMEN IN ISRAEL: A STATE OF THEIR OWN 235–36
(2004); SHAHAR LIFSHITZ, COHABITATION LAW IN ISRAEL FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A CIVIL LAW
THEORY OF THE FAMILY 55–60 (2005) [hereinafter LIFSHITZ, COHABITATION LAW]; Shahar Lifshitz,
A Civil Turn Point of Israeli Civil Family Law, 3 TZIVYON 37 (2002).
12. See LIFSHITZ, COHABITATION LAW supra note 11; see also Amnon Rubinshtein, The
Rights to Marriage, 3 TEL-AVIV STUD. IN L. 433 (1973).
13. See, e.g., Draft Bill Civil Marriage and Civil Divorce, 2004 HH, 2199; Draft Bill Civil
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the combination of political power of the religious parties, civil
consideration about the unity of the Jewish nation,14 and nationalhistorical considerations regarding Jewish marriage as a national
symbol15 led to the rejection of those proposals. Thus, only religious
marriages are recognized in Israel.
2. The secular response
Notwithstanding the fact that there are no official civil marriages in
Israel, Israeli secular law has developed a variety of alternatives to
marriage. The most prominent alternative is cohabiting with a partner
outside marriage. The legal regulation of cohabitation is an outstanding
example of the type of civil family laws that have developed in Israel in
the shadow of religious law. These laws comprise a combination of civil
legislation and liberal judges‘ rulings, which reject religious principles
and restrictions.16 Historically, the trend toward the expansion of the
institution of cohabitation began with the development of social laws
governing cohabitant partners, which grant them certain rights. These
social laws include legislation relating to the protection of tenants, laws
conferring social insurance rights (through Israel‘s National Insurance
Institute), regulations dealing with entitlement to benefit payments from
various bodies, and laws regulating the rights to termination of
employment payments.17 Alongside these social laws, Succession Law
5725-196518 also extends the rights of ―married persons‖ to cohabitants.
Beyond the economic legislation, additional laws equate the status of
cohabitant partners with that of married couples. These include sections
of the criminal statutes that deal with domestic violence, the Names Law
5716-1956,19 and the Family Courts Law 5755-199520 (which included
cohabitants in its definition of family members).
Marriage and Civil Divorce, 2000 HH, 2125; see also PINHAS SHIFMAN, CIVIL MARRIAGE IN
ISRAEL: THE CASE FOR REFORM 1995.
14. In Israeli discourse it was argued that the establishment of civil marriage will encourage
the siblings of religious Jews to get married to secular partners, and as a result, the national unity
will be harmed. See SHAHAR LIFSHITZ, THE SPOUSAL REGISTRY 35–37 (2007).
15. See Pinhas Shifman, State Recognition of Religious Marriage: Symbols and Content, 21
ISR. L. REV. 501 (1986) (on religious marriage as a symbol).
16. For the tension between the recognition of the cohabitation relationship and the religious
point of view, see, e.g., the comments of Justice Silberg in CA 337/62 Riezenfeld v. Jacobson [1963]
IsrSC 16(2) 1009, 1021; SHIFMAN, supra note 13.
17. For a comprehensive discussion on cohabitation law in Israel, see LIFSHITZ,
COHABITATION LAW, supra note 11; Shahar Lifshitz, The External Rights of Cohabitating Couples
in Israel, 37 ISR. L.REV. 346, 389–94 (2003).
18. Succession Law, 1965, S.H. 63.
19. Names Law, 1956, S.H. 94.
20. Family Courts Law, 1995, S.H. 393.
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The rulings of the supreme court in Civil Appeal 2000/97 Lindorn v.
Karnit—Road Accident Victims‟ Fund21 play a significant role in the
augmenting the legal status of cohabitants to that of married persons. In
this case, the Israeli Supreme Court expanded the rights of cohabitants
beyond those expressly provided in legislation. This development, which
is a departure from earlier precedent, allows the courts, in principle, to
grant all the rights currently accorded to married couples to those couples
living in cohabitation relationships. A number of decisions by the
Supreme Court delivered over recent years appear to confirm this trend.22
The extension of cohabitant rights was not accompanied by a more
narrow definition of cohabitants. On the contrary, legal rulings have
adopted more flexible criteria which makes it easier for couples to be
considered cohabitants.23 Firstly, most of the laws granting rights to
cohabiting couples do not stipulate a minimum period of time for them to
be recognized as such.24 Laws that do stipulate a minimum period of time
to attain cohabitation status require a relatively short time period (usually
one year).25 Recent rulings have continued this trend, and in many cases
where the law does not stipulate a minimum period, courts have also

21. CA 2000/97 Lindorn v. Karnit, [1999] IsrSC 55(1) 12. In this case the court held,
contrary to earlier precedent, that the term ―spouse‖ in Section 78 of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance
includes cohabitants. Consequently, the court held that the partner of the victim could also obtain
financial compensation under that section.
22. Thus, for example, recently in CA 2622/01 Manager of Land Betterment Tax v. Aliza
Lebanon, [2003] IsrSC 37(5) 309, the court continued this policy by granting cohabitants tax
benefits available to married couples, without seeking express legislative authority. For additional
recent rulings in various areas where the court equalized the status of cohabitants with those of
married couples, see Lifshitz, supra note 17, at 394–97.
23. For a definition of cohabitants‘ case law and legislation, see Daniel Friedman, The
Cohabitants in Israeli Law, C2 TEL AVIV STUD. IN L. 459, 461–63 (1973); Lifshitz, supra note 17
Ariel Rosen-Zvi, Israel: An Impasse, 29 J. FAM. L. 379, 382–83 (1991).
24. See, e.g., Article 1 of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Law, 1991, S.H. 138; Article
21 of the Standing Service in the Israel Defense Forces (Retirement) Law (Combined), 1985, S.H.
141; Article 86 of the Penal Code, 1977, S.H. 25; Article 5 of the Dismissal Compensation Law,
1963, S.H. 163; Article 1 of the Disabled Persons (Payments and Rehabilitation) Law [Combined
Version], 1959 S.H. 295; Article 1 of the Disabled Veterans of the War against the Nazis Law, 1954,
S.H. 76; Article 1 of the Families of Soldiers Killed in Action (Payments and Rehabilitation) Law,
1950, S.H. 162. Many other laws refer to the definition of cohabitation in these laws; accordingly,
the definition of cohabitation in these laws and the absence of any demand for a minimum period of
cohabitation are highly important.
25. See, for example, the Real Estate Taxation (Betterment, Sale and Purchase) Law, 1963,
S.H. 156, which establishes, in Article 62(B) the condition of cohabitation in a sold residential
apartment for a duration of at least one year prior to the sale. In addition, several laws require a
minimum period of joint cohabitation even in the case of a married couple, and this requirement
naturally also applies to cohabiting couples. See, for example, Article 20A of the Tenant Protection
Law [Combined Version], 1972, S.H.176, which requires a minimum period of cohabitation of at
least six months. See also Article 238 of the National Insurance Law [Combined Version], 1995,
S.H. 205 which establishes that the right to old age pension and survivor‘s pension conditioned on at
least one year of marriage.

364

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 22

refrained from establishing a minimum period for cohabitation.26
Moreover, the rulings have clarified that a couple may be recognized as
cohabiting partners even if they live together for only a very brief
period.27
Secondly, while Israeli law usually requires joint habitation as a
condition for recognition as a cohabiting couple,28 there is no formal
requirement that the couple share a common registered address. Given
the trend to extend the institution of cohabitation, the requirement of
joint habitation, itself has often been interpreted in a restrictive manner.29
Accordingly, there have been cases in which couples have been
recognized as cohabiting partners and received the rights accruing from
this status for periods when they did not live together in the same
residential unit,30 and even when their relationships were completely
disconnected.31
Thirdly, there have been rulings in which the presence of additional
intimate relations alongside the relations with the partner claiming the

26. See, for example, the recent ruling of the National Labor Court in LA 183/99, Aaron v.
Supervisor of Pension Payments [2002] 37 Labor National 396. While the cohabiting partner‘s claim
for a pension was rejected, her claim for a grant was accepted, since the legislation relating to the
right of a cohabiting partner to a grant does not include any time restriction.
27. Thus, for example, in CA 621/69 Nissim v. Juster [1970] IsrSC 24 (1) 617, which related
to the inheritance laws, the court established that a period of close to one year could be sufficient,
provided that during this entire period the joint life took place on the basis of the same profound
relations that generally exist between a legally-married husband and wife. In this respect, the court
determined, on pp. 623–24, that: ―There can be no doubt that such a period of time (viz. one year –
S.L.) and even much shorter than that is certainly sufficient.‖ These comments were quoted in CA
4305/91 Sadeh v. Kavors, [1994] 32 Dinim Elyon 803, and have been quoted frequently by the labor
courts in discussing the rights of cohabiting partners. See, e.g., LCC 57/14-6 Ohana v. Makefet
Pension and Payments Fund, Coop. Ass‟n Ltd., 9 Labor Regional 985.
28. See the definition of a cohabiting partner in the National Insurance Law, supra note 25,
one of the components of which is that ―she resided with him at the time of his death.‖ See also LC
44/62-0 National Insurance Institute v. N. Mishali,16 Piskei Din Avoda 3 in para. 3 of the ruling, as
well as Article 4(A)(1) of the Civil Service (Retirement) Law [combined version], 1970, S.H. 65.
29. See 1826/99 Shelly Meir v. National Insurance – Haifa Branch [2002] (unpublished).
Paragraph 14 of the ruling states:
Regarding the requirement of the law in defining ―his wife‖ for joint habitation – this is
not necessarily an additional requirement for habitation under the same roof, but rather
the meaning of this requirement is that the relations between the partners in accordance
with the double test is such that it may accordingly be determined that she lives with him
in light of the manner in which the partners managed their joint lives on this general
subject.
See MENACHEM GOLDBERG, SOCIAL INSURANCE FILE: NATIONAL INSURANCE LAWS, NATIONAL
HEALTH INSURANCE LAWS, PENSION LAWS; LAWS, REGULATIONS, ORDERS, PRECEDENTS,
EXPLANATIONS 43 (24 ed., 2004), and the rulings noted therein.
30. See cases discussed in Lifshitz, supra note 17, at 409 n.176.
31. Id. at 409 n.177.
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rights of a cohabiting partner has not negated eligibility for these rights. 32
Furthermore, courts have allowed couples to obtain rights as cohabitants,
even when one of the partners is married.33
Lastly, there have been cases in which even prior declarations by
persons that they reside alone have not subsequently negated their claim,
or the claim of their partner, to the rights of cohabiting partners.34
B. The Potential Lesson for the Same-Sex Marriage Debate
Formally, the conservative position, which emphasizes entry
limitations on marriage, won a decisive victory in Israel.35 Ironically, the
strict limitations on the right to marry were a trigger for the development
of the institution of cohabitation as a substitute for formal marriage. In
the Israeli legal and public discourse the need to ―compensate‖ those
unable to marry is presented, time and again, as justification for
strengthening the institution of cohabitation.36 Yet, marital rights were
awarded to all cohabitants, and not only to those who are barred from
marrying. This state of affairs has greatly weakened the traditional
privileges associated with legal marriage. At a later stage, the weakening
of legal marriage was not limited to a blurring of the distinction between
it and cohabitation—it was also weakened by the recognition of samesex units,37 the validation of spousal relationships with non-married
partners,38 and the cancellation of privileges formerly granted to families
32. See id. at 409 n.178.
33. This was first decided in CA 384/61 State of Israel v. Pessler [1962] IsrSC 16(1)102. In
this connection there have been varying shifts in the trend seen in certain legislation—most
prominently the Succession Law—which have negated the rights of cohabitants married to other
person. At the same time, in those cases where the legislation has refrained from expressly
establishing this qualification, the courts have continued to follow their earlier policy. See HCJ
6086/94 Ella Nazri v. Officer Responsible for the Population Registry [1996] IsrSC 49(5) 693, in
which the Supreme Court allowed the cohabiting partner of a married man to change her name to his
notwithstanding the objections of the legal wife. For the argument that by so doing, the Supreme
Court was enabling de facto bigamy, see LIFSHITZ, COHABITATION LAW, supra note 11, at 267–74.
34. See CA 481/73 Rosenberg v. Stessel [1974] IsrSC 29 (1) 505.
35. See supra note 10.
36. For the role of cohabitation as an alternative to marriage or as a technique for
circumventing religious law, see LIFSHITZ, COHABITATION LAW, supra note 11, at 55–67; ROSENZVI, supra note 10, at 303; SHIFMAN, supra note 13, at 19–20; Daniel Friedman, The Cohabitee in
Israeli Law, C 2 TEL-AVIV U. L. REV. 459, 483 (1973); see also HCJ 693/91 Ophrat v.
Superintendant of Population Registry [1993] IsrSC 47(1) 749 paras. 38–47 of Justice Barak‘s
judgment.
37. See HCJ 721/94 El-Al v. Danilowitz [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 749 (holding that same-sex
cohabitants entitled to cohabitants‘ rights); see also HCJ 3045/05 Ben Ari v. The Director of the
Population Administration in the Ministry of the Interior [2006] (not published) (directing to register
same-sex couples who married abroad as married based on a marriage certificate issued in the
foreign country, but the court does not decide on the essential validity of the marriage).
38. See supra note 33.
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based on spousal ties.39 Beyond the economic benefits, modern Israeli
law also encourages unconventional family types by enhancing the
possibility of adoption by same-sex couples40 and by enabling single
woman to receive artificial insemination with state support and
financing.41 Thus, in Israel, the conservative-religious camp‘s relative
success in limiting the entry to marriage has harmed this camp‘s broader
agenda for the preference of legal marriages.
In recent years, a similar dynamic has emerged in the United States.
On one hand, the religious-conservative camp won a victory in most
states in preventing same-sex marriage.42 On the other hand, the unique
status of marriage has been weakened by American proposals to (1)
narrow the legal gap between marriage and cohabitation,43 (2) recognize
and support un-conventional family lifestyles,44 (3) decrease marriage as
a relevant factor in adoption and assisted reproduction cases,45 (4)
develop alternative institutions to marriage,46 and (5) abolish marriage as
39. Article 74 (B) (1) (a) of the National Insurance Law [Combined Version], 1995, S.H.
205; Single Families Law, 1992, S.H. 147; Article 2 (5) of the Income Assurance Law, 1980. S.H.
30.
40. For more on lesbian adoption see HCJ 1779/99 Berner – Kadish v. Minister of the
Interior [2000] IsrSC 54(2) 368 and CA 10280/01 Yarus-Haqaq v. Attorney General [2005] IsrSC
59(5) 64.
41. HCJ 9981/95 Yarus-Haqaq v. Health Department, [1997] (Tak-Al 97 (1) 939) (abolition
of regulations that require social worker assessment as a pre-condition for assistance in artificial
insemination for a single woman); CC(JER) 5222/06 Unidentified Person v. Minister of Health and
others [2006] Tak-Mach 2712(3) (permitting fertilization from a married person). But cf. HCJ
2458/01 New Family v. Approvals Comm. for Surrogate Motherhood Agreements, Ministry of
Health [2002] IsrSC 57(1) 419 (holding that the inability of a single woman to be a surrogate is
discrimination, but the law was not invoked due to constitutional restraint motives).
42. Indeed, Massachusetts is currently the only American state which recognizes same-sex
marriage. See Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, (Mass. 2003). For a
comprehensive survey of the recognition of same-sex couples in the U.S. as well as other western
countries, see Lynn D. Wardle, A Response to the “Conservative Case” for Same-Sex Marriage:
Same-Sex Marriage and the Tragedy of the Commons, BYU J. PUB. L. (forthcoming 2007).
43. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLE OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002); Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of
Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1265 (2001).
44. See, e.g., June Carbone, The Role of Adoption in Winning Public Recognition for Adult
Partnerships, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 341 (2006) (seeking to use adoption as a substitute for marriage in
creating and recognizing intimate relationship and families); Leah Ward Sears, The “Marriage
Gap”: A Case for Strengthening Marriage in the 21 st Century, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1243, 1251 (2007)
(At the other end of the debate, some scholars argue that ―the traditional marriage-and-family
paradigm imposes an ethnocentric ‗benchmark‘ or ‗ideal.‘ This paradigm, they say, does not speak
to the experience of racial minorities, women, single parents, divorced and remarried persons, gays
and lesbians, and others.‖); see also the opinions discussed by Linda C. McClain, Intimate Affiliation
and Democracy: Beyond Marriage?, 32 HOFSTRA. L. REV 379, 403 (2003).
45. See Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the Marriage Movement: The Case
Against Martial Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 305 (2006) (opposing the favoritism toward marriage in adoption and assisted reproduction).
46. The most common are the civil union and the domestic partnerships laws. See the survey
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a legal institution.47 To be sure, each of these developments is supported
by arguments that are independent from the same-sex marriage debate.48
Yet, implicitly or explicitly, the exclusion of gay couples from marriage
motivates the trends that narrow the gap between marriage and other
types of family lifestyles49 and the calls to abolish marriage.50
Taking into account the Israeli experience, conservatives should be
concerned that, in the end, the conservative camp‘s relative success in
negating the possibility of same-sex marriages will be a Pyrrhic victory
harming this camp‘s broader agenda for the preference of legal
marriages.

in Wardle, supra note 42.
47. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (Routledge 1995); Daniel A. Crane, A “JudeoChristian” Argument for Privatizing Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1221 (2006); Elizabeth Scott,
World Without Marriage, FLQ (forthcoming 2009); Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage:
The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161 (2006).
48. Fineman‘s proposal to abolish marriage, for example, is based on the need to support the
mother-child relationship regardless of spousal pattern. The proposals to apply marriage law to
cohabitants are motivated in many cases by the need to protect the economically weak side. See, e.g.,
Blumberg, supra note 43.
49. The American Law Institution project, for example, was interpreted by several scholars
as part of this trend. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALI Domestic
Partnership Principles Are One Step in the Right Direction, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353, 354 (2004)
(praising principles for taking ―an important step in the right direction of making marriage matter
less‖); Sears, supra note 44 (According to the ALI, a central purpose of family law should be to
protect and support family diversity. The report views ―traditional marriage‖ as merely one of many
possible and equally valid family forms.); Katherine Shaw Spaht, How Law Can Reinvigorate a
Robust Vision of Marriage and Rival Its Post-Modern Competitor, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y 449,
454–55 (2004) (―[T]he three reporters for the project describe in notes and commentary their vision
of marriage as . . . simply one of a variety of intimate and close relationships.‖); see also Blumberg,
supra note 43, at 1268-69 (asserting that, ―in the United States, same-sex couples have been the
dominant force in the movement to regularize nonmarital cohabitation‖). See generally Marsha
Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?: An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of Cohabitant Obligation, 52
UCLA L. REV. 815 , 869 (2005) (―The evidence suggests that the perceived interests of same-sex
couples have nonetheless been important in building academic and legislative support for the
conscriptive [i.e. imposing marriage law on cohabitants] alternative‖). For the opposite influence,
i.e., the influence of cohabitation law on the recognition of same sex marriage, see Grace Ganz
Blumberg, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Conjugal Relationships: The 2003 California Domestic
Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act in Comparative Civil Rights and Family Law Perspective,
51. UCLA. L . REV. 1555 (2004). For the connection between the same sex marriage struggle and
additional struggles for different lifestyle, see Chai R. Feldblum, Gay Is Good: The Moral Case for
Marriage Equality and More, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 139 (2005). For the influence of the samesex marriage debate on a general argument against privileging marriage in the context of state
assistance to reproduction, see Storrow, supra note 45.
50. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 47 (holding that the opposition to same-sex couple is stronger
in the case of marriage than in the case of civil union and therefore civil union should replace
marriage); see also Zelinsky, supra note 47 (abolishing marriage diminishes the struggle between
supporters and opponents of same-sex marriage).
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III. A CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL RESPONSE TO THE CONSERVATIVE
CAMPAIGN
A. The Liberal Case Against Equating Marriage and Cohabitation
The modern trend narrowing the legal gap between marriage and
cohabitation was originally identified in legal and public discourse in
Israel51 as well as in the United States52 and other western countries53 as
based on liberal values of autonomy, freedom, and contractual models of
regulation.
Contrary to this conventional wisdom, in many cases equating
cohabitation to marriage harms the liberal values of freedom of choice
and autonomy. In order to clarify this point, this Comment will focus on
the regulation of the economic relationship between the cohabitant
partners (as opposed to their rights against the state and other external
bodies).
This Part will present two liberal arguments against imposing
marriage law on cohabitants: contractual and pluralist. The contractual
argument focuses on the partners‘ wishes. As long as one speaks of
couples that have the legal capacity to be married, cohabitation may
reflect their rejection of marriage laws. One should keep in mind that in
the context of the economic relationship between the spouses, the legal
rights of one spouse are the legal obligations of the other. So one may
assume that the reason the cohabitants are not married is that at least one
of them did not want to assume these obligations. In this case, imposing
marriage laws on people who reject marriage does not respect their
51. For the identical character of ―progressive‖ liberal views aimed at strengthening the
institution of cohabitation, see ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 10, at 306, and Rosen-Zvi, supra note 23, at
385 (using the institution of cohabitation to illustrate the liberal voice of the family law system in
Israel). See also Shifman, supra note 15, at 33–35 (regarding the recognition of cohabitation as a
social development, which at least part of the public regards as progressive, and part of the public as
immoral).
52. See H. A. Finlay, Defining the Informal Marriage, 3 U.N.S.W L. J. 279 (1980)
(supporting applying marriage law to cohabitants using liberal-contractual arguments); Herma Hill
Kay & Carol Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CAL. L. REV. 937 (1977)
(supporting the process of granting rights to cohabitants on the basis of liberal rationales of
increasing freedom, particularly freedom of choice); Harry G. Prince, Public Policy Limitations on
Cohabitation Agreements: Unruly Horse or Circus Pony?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 163, (1986)
(supporting more freedom of contract in cohabitant relationship).
53. See, e.g., A. M. van de Wiel, Cohabitation Outside Marriage in Dutch Law, in
MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES 212, 215 (John. M. Eekelaar &
Sanford N. Katz eds., 1980) (presenting the process of applying marriage law to cohabitants as an
element of a general policy emphasizing the neutrality of the state towards various lifestyles in
relation to Holland); see also Svend Danielsen, Unmarried Partners: Scandinavian Law in the
Making, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 65 (1983) (The principle of neutrality is at the center of
Sweden‘s approach to cohabitation.).
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choice.54
The contractual nature of quasi-marital obligations is particularly
relevant to those cases in which the relationship between the parties lasts
only a relatively short time. In many cases, living together is a
preliminary stage before marriage. Sociologists who have investigated
this phenomenon tend to view this period of cohabitation as a trial period
in which the parties are likely to determine whether or not they wish to
marry.55 Thus, a substantive legal system that imposes quasi-marital
obligations on cohabitants who have lived together for only a short
period of time in fact negates the significance of this trial period.
From a contractual perspective, ignoring that there is a trial period
blurs the boundaries between pre-contractual stages and contractual
obligations. This blurring only exacerbates the contractual problems
raised by the institution of cohabitation. The contractual argument
focuses on the wishes of partners and the law‘s need to reflect the
different levels of commitment between cohabitants and married people.
Unlike the contractual argument, the pluralist argument focuses on
the need of the law to create different types of institutions that support
the diversity of spousal lifestyles.56 This argument is based on modern
liberal approaches that emphasize individual autonomy. It stresses that
individual autonomy means not only the absence of formal limitations on
the individual‘s choices but also the existence of a range of options. The
modern liberal approaches emphasize the duty of the liberal state to
create a diversity of social institutions that enable the individual to make
genuine choices between various alternatives.57 The application of these
approaches to cohabitant law may lead to surprising conclusions. Think
of a world in which the law distinguishes between marriage and
cohabitation. In such a world, a couple in a spousal relationship that
54. For the contractual argument against imposing marriage law on cohabitants, see Garrison,
supra note 49; David Westfall, Forcing Incidents of Marriage on Unmarried Cohabitants: The
American Law Institute‟s Principles of Family Dissolution, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 1471
(2001).
55. There is extensive sociological literature concerning cohabitation as a test period prior to
marriage. See, e.g., Thomas J. Abernathy, Adolescent Cohabitation: A Form of Courtship or
Marriage?, 16 ADOLESCENCE 791 (1981); Alfred DeMaris & William MacDonald, Premarital
Cohabitation and Marital Instability: A Test of the Unconventionality Hypothesis, 55 J. OF
MARRIAGE AND FAM. 399 (1993); Alfred DeMaris & K. Vaninadha Rao, Premarital Cohabitation
and Subsequent Marital Instability in the United States: A Reassessment, 54 J. OF MARRIAGE AND
FAM. 178 (1992).
56. While the contractual argument was already claimed in the legal literature, the pluralist
argument is a renovation of this article. The argument however is submitted very briefly in this
article and it will be extended in another project, which is still a work in progress. See SHAHAR
LIFSHITZ, MARRIAGE AGAINST THEIR WILL? A LIBERAL THEORY OF COHABITATION LAW
(Forthcoming).
57. See JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW
AND POLITICS 179 (Clareendon Press 1994).
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might be characterized as a sociological marriage may choose between a
high level of legal commitment (i.e., legal marriage) and a lower level of
commitment (i.e., cohabitation). Such a framework would offer
individuals a range of options.
On the other hand, think of a legal world which is totally in accord
with the supposedly liberal position that equates the status of cohabitants
to that of married couples. In such a world, couples who desire to
maintain an intimate relationship that can be characterized as a
sociological marriage are automatically subject to the system of spousal
laws. Such a framework does not offer couples social institutions with
meaningful differences nor the possibility of making genuine choices.
Alongside the liberal arguments against equalizing cohabitation and
marriage, there are also contrasting arguments which support imposing
marriage law on cohabitants. The first counter-argument rejects the
premise that cohabitants intentionally reject the commitment that
marriage law reflects. According to this argument, one should not deny
the implied commitment inherent in long-term cohabitant relationships,
even in the absence of a formal commitment.58 The second counterargument focuses on gender differences, including power imbalance and
economic disparity. Failing to impose marriage law on cohabitants may
result in injustice and exploitation.59
Even if the counter arguments demonstrate that in some cases
applying marriage law to cohabitants is justified, those arguments do not
justify total equation of cohabitation and marriage.
Firstly, even if, in certain instances, cohabitation relationships reflect
a natural continuation of a previous lifestyle in other cases, refraining
from marriage reflects a conscious rejection of marriage and the
associated legal consequences, or trial period prior to marriage.60
Therefore, just as it would be problematic to adopt a policy that relates to
all cohabitants as not being interested in the ―legalization‖ of their
spousal relationships, so too it is problematic to adopt the opposite
policy, which equate marriage and cohabitation laws and ignores those
58. For the long-term commitment embedded in marriage, see Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E.
Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1998). For the long-term commitment
embedded in cohabitation, see Elizabeth S. Scott, Domestic Partnerships, Implied Contracts and
Law Reform, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE‘S
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 331 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006)
[hereinafter Scott, Domestic Partnerships]; Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and
Collective Responsibility for Dependency, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225 (2004).
59. For the extra-contractual perspective, see Blumberg, supra note 43 and Ira M. Ellman,
―Contract Thinking” Was Marvin‘s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365 (2001).
60. For the sociological studies that supported these possibilities, see supra note 55. In
practice, even the studies which raise additional reasons why couples might choose not to marry do
not deny the possibility that a life of cohabitation may reflect a trial marriage period.
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cohabitants who rejected, or at least haven‘t taken yet, marriage
commitments Furthermore, it is hard to ignore the basic intuition,61
backed up by economic, social, and psychological studies, that the
stability62 and level of commitment in the relationship between married
couples is higher than that in the relationship between cohabitants.63 The
law must reflect these differences in the level of commitment between
the two institutions by distinguish marriage and cohabitation law.
Secondly, from a liberal perspective one should justify any deviation
from express or implied arrangements. In those cases in which such
justification is missing, the imposition of a coerced obligation is certainly
problematic.
Finally, the counter arguments do not handle with the pluralistliberal argument that supports the existence of multiple social institutions
and, as a result, seeks to preserve the distinction between legal marriage
and sociological marriage.
Taking into account all the layers of the previous discussion, one
should conclude that while the counter arguments justify selective
application of elements of marriage law to cohabitants in certain
circumstances, they fail to support the total legal equation of marriage to
cohabitation. Additionally, the proper balance between the liberal
arguments and the counter arguments should result in distinctions
between different kinds and or stages of cohabitants such as trial
marriages, rejection of legal marriage, and the desire to continue with a
previously existing lifestyle. In order to distinguish between those types,
strict ―gatekeeper rules‖ should define circumstances which call for the
application of marriage commitments to certain kinds of cohabitants.
Suggesting a comprehensive model for cohabitant law is beyond the
scope of this Comment.64 Yet, even the existing discussion demonstrates
61. At the same time, this intuition is limited to circumstances in which there is no legal or
ideological obstacle to marriage.
62. For a substantive distinction between the elements of cohabiting relationships and those
of spousal relationships, see Steven L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and Cohabiting
Relationships, 16 J. FAM. ISSUES 53 (1995). See also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Calibrated Commitment:
The Legal Treatment of Marriage and Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1435, 1439–40
(presenting empirical studies which show that on average the relationship between married couples
is more stable that the relationships between cohabitants).
63. See William Bishop, „Is He Married?‟: Marriage as Information, 34 U. TORONTO L. J
245 (1984); David D. Haddock & Daniel D. Polsby, Family as a Rational Classification, 74 WASH.
U. L. Q. 15, (1996); Michael J. Trebilock, Marriage as a Signal, in THE FALL AND RISE OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 245 (F. H. Buckley ed., 1999) (suggesting theoretical analyses which
explain by means of various disciplines how marriage reflects a message or in economic terminology
signals a high level of commitment by the couple);. For the role of marriage as a social institution
which has the task of reflecting a system of cultural understandings, at the core of which is the
notion of mutual obligation, see Russell D. Murphy, A Good Man is Hard to Find; Marriage as an
Institution, 47 J. OF ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 27 (2002).
64. I suggest such a comprehensive model in my book for the Israeli context. See LIFSHITZ,
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the severe consequences which may flow from the application of
marriage law to all types of cohabitants. Unfortunately, as the next two
Parts demonstrate, unselective application of marriage law as a whole to
all kinds of cohabitants is exactly the situation in Israel and some aspects
of law in the United States are going in that direction as well.
B. Marriage Against Their Will: The Case of Cohabitation Law in
Israel
Generally speaking, Israeli Law tends to ignore the liberal arguments
against imposing marital commitments on cohabitants. Thus, Israeli Law
applies marriage law to cohabitants‘ relationships not only in the context
of the external right, i.e., the rights of cohabitants against third parties,
but also regarding the mutual commitments. Consequently, in contrast to
the recommendation in the previous part to selectively apply marriage
commitments on cohabitants, the Israeli law equates cohabitants‘
inheritance,65 property,66 and alimony67 rights to those of married persons
and sometimes grants cohabitants even greater rights than married
couples.68 Furthermore, in many legal systems, multiple legal contexts
COHABITATION LAW, supra note 11. I am also currently working on a corresponding model for
American law. See LIFSHITZ, supra note 56.
65. The Succession Law, 1965, S.H. 63, Section 55, in the absence of a will, vests
cohabitants with a right of succession equivalent to that of married spouses. Section 57(c) of the Law
vests cohabitants with the right to claim maintenance from the estate.
66. See, e.g., CA 749/82 Moston v. Viderman [1989] IsrSC 43(1) 278; CA 52/80 Shachar v.
Friedman [1984] IsrSC 38(1) 443. At the same time, in a few cases, the Supreme Court made it clear
that the presumption of community of assets in the case of cohabitants is relatively ―weaker‖ than
that applying to married couples, and thus the two cannot be completely equated. See Shachar, IsrSC
38(1) at 458; CA 4385/91 Salem v. Carmi [1997] IsrSC 51(1) 337, 348.
67. See CA 805/82 Versano v. Cohen [1983] IsrSC 37(1) 529. In this judgment the court
raised the possibility that in the future the courts would infer an implied agreement from the
relationship between cohabitants, according to which a maintenance obligation would apply between
the couple even following separation. Additionally, the court held that conceivably, even a unilateral
decision to conclude a relationship, entailing eviction of one of the partners from the residence,
might provide a cause of action for a claim for compensation in respect of the damage caused as a
result of the breach of an implied contractual condition, to the effect that a reasonable amount of
time had to be allowed to pursue separation proceedings between the parties. This possibility arose
again in CA 2000/97 Lindorn v. Carnit – Road Accident Victims Fund [1999] IsrSC 55(1) 12, para.
18 of the judgment and is currently applied by lowers courts.
68. Thus, for example the property relations of married persons are currently addressed by
The Spouses (Property Relations) Law, 5733-1973, 27 LSI 313 (1972-73) (Isr.), while the property
relationship between cohabitants are established by case law development titled the community
property presumption. The extent of community of assets under the Property Relations Law is less
than that applied under the presumption of community of assets, both in terms of scope (the Property
Relations Law defines various classes of assets which the courts include within the presumption of
community of assets, but which are not subject to the resource balancing arrangement) and in terms
of power (the Property Relations Law establishes a deferred community of assets, that is, an
arrangement by which the couple‘s assets remain separate during the course of the marriage, but
which grants each spouse a contractual right to claim his share of the assets, under an arrangement
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require a balance between conditions for entry into a particular status and
the consequences thereof. (The more that is entailed by inclusion in a
particular legal status, the stricter the entry conditions need to be, and
vice versa.)69 Consequently, one might have expected that expansion of
the scope of mutual economic rights between cohabitants in Israel would
be accompanied by the imposition of stricter entry conditions to this
class. However, Israeli cohabitation law has not respected the necessity
of this balance, and the expanded economic obligations arising from this
status have not led to additional strictness in the entry conditions for that
status. On the contrary, legal decisions relating to the definition of
cohabitation, in the context of economic relations between cohabiting
partners, have maintained and even expanded the criteria for entry into
the status of cohabitants. Thus, the absence of a permanent place of
residence shared by both partners,70 evidence of maintaining separate
assets,71 disloyalty toward the cohabitants partner, namely the conduct of
intimate relations in parallel to those conducted with the cohabitating
partner,72 frequent and violent quarrels between the partners,73 the lack of
called ―resource balancing‖, only upon dissolution of the marriage. The presumption of community
of assets, on the other hand, defines an immediate community of assets, and permits each spouse to
apply to the courts during the lifetime of the marriage and request the right to realize his property
rights.). Ironically, therefore, the extent of community of assets existing today between cohabitants
is higher than that applicable to married couples. In the context of alimony, unlike cohabitants that
are entitled to alimony after their separation with regard to married couples, the obligation of
maintenance is determined by the personal status laws, and, in line with those laws as they apply to
the majority of couples in Israel, the obligation to provide maintenance ceases absolutely upon
divorce. For the irony in those situations see LIFSHITZ, COHABITATION LAW, supra note 11, at ch 7.
69. Thus, for example, Gilmore explains in his famous work, GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH
OF CONTRACT (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., Ohio State University Press 1974), that the contractual
commitment in classic contract laws was very strict. This strictness was balanced by hard entry
conditions (in particular the demand for consideration). In contrast, modern contract laws provide for
a softer contractual commitment, and accordingly the severity of the entry conditions has also been
lessened. A relationship of a similar nature exists between the divorce laws and marriage dissolution
laws. Thus, canonical law, where divorce was particularly strictly regimented, was characterized by
entry conditions which were fairly harsh and therefore this law saw the development of a great body
of rulings dealing with the possibility of declaring the dissolution of marriages. See R. H.
HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 74–100 (D. E. C. Yale ed., Cambridge
University Press 1974); RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN
WESTERN SOCIETY 9–13 (Cambridge University Press 1988).
70. See, e.g., CA 79/83 A-G v. Shukrun [1985] IsrSC 39(2) 690 (The couple lived
occasionally in the flat of the man and occasionally in the flat of the woman, nonetheless this fact
did not negate their status as cohabitants.); see also Estate File (EF) (Haifa) 833/81 Avraham Meir v.
A-G [1982] IsrDC 1982(2) 428.
71. See CA 107/87 Alon v. Mendelson [1989] IsrSC 43(1) 431, 438 (where it was held that
separation of assets does not negate the status of cohabitants).
72. See, e.g., CA 79/83 A-G v. Shukrun [1985] IsrSC 39(2) 690 (where notwithstanding that
the deceased maintained a number of intimate relationships concurrently, his permanent partner was
granted the status of cohabitant for the purpose of the Succession Law); see also CA 4385/91 Salem
v. Carmi [1997] IsrSC 51(1) 337 (where even though the partner (Salem) on certain occasions also
maintained intimate relations with other men, and even though she maintained a fairly strong
relationship with her ex-husband, Salem and Carmi were declared to be cohabitants).
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intimate relations, and even evidence of cohabitants living in separate
rooms74 have not prevented couples from being considered as
cohabitants. The courts also have refused to define a minimum period of
shared residence necessary for cohabitation. In one case, the fact that the
couple had lived together for only a few months was considered
sufficient for them to be deemed cohabitants for the purposes of the
Succession Law.75
The unique position of Israeli cohabitant law is connected to Israeli
family law and to the view of the institution of cohabitation as a secular
alternative to religious marriage.76 That being the case, cohabitation is
not viewed as a general rejection of the institution of marriage, but rather
as a kind of secular marriage for those who are unable or unwilling to
marry within a religious ceremony. The secular lawmakers feel an
obligation to provide a remedy for those who chose or were forced to
choose this form of spousal relationship.77
Viewing cohabitation as a secular alternative to religious marriage
undermines the liberal contractual view which purports that cohabitation
reflects a conscious decision by the parties involved to reject the legal
consequences of marriage. That being the case, these liberal contractual
arguments become irrelevant in the Israeli law context. Moreover, in
contrast to the liberal-pluralist concern, the institution of cohabitation,
which in fact plays the role of secular marriage, actually contributes to an
increase in the number of social institutions.78 Therefore, the liberal
arguments are almost meaningless in Israel. It is not surprising that these
considerations do not carry significant weight in Israeli law, which is
generally faithful to the idea of an almost blanket equation of the status
of cohabitants and that of married couples.
The uniqueness of Israeli family law justifies a certain variation in
the types of legal arrangements relating to cohabitants. However, it
would be correct to assume that in Israel, at least some of those in
cohabitation relationships choose to do so for universal reasons, like
being in experimental period (trial marriage) or rejection of the
institution of marriage and not for reasons that stem from the specific

73. See, e.g., EF (Haifa) 2365/85, Motion 1387/85 Abu v. Abu [1986] IsrDC 1987(2) 31.
74. See CA 4385/91 Salem v. Carmi [1997] IsrSC 51(1) 337.
75. See EF (Tel-Aviv) 3693/90 Amir v. Zeger (unpublished) (residence together over a
number of months, cut short because of the death of one of the couple, was sufficient in order to
define the woman as the heir for the purposes of the Succession Law).
76. See supra Part II. A.2.
77. See supra note 36.
78. See SHIFMAN, supra note 13, at 57–61; see, e.g., HCJ 73/66 Zmulon v. Minister of the
Interior [1966] IsrSC 20(4) 645, 660 (Justice Vitkon clarified that the rationale of cohabitant law in
Israel is closely connected to the religious character of marriage laws in Israel).
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Israeli context (the inability or unwillingness to take part in a religious
marriage ceremony).79 That being the case, it would have been
appropriate to expect the Israeli courts dealing with questions of
cohabitation to attempt to distinguish between unique Israeli cohabitants
and universal cohabitants.
In regard to Israeli cohabitants, one should not necessarily view the
couple as having rejected the institution of legal marriage. On the
contrary, in many of these cases the couples would be interested in a
legal marital bond, but they are either not interested or not willing to
have a religious marriage. In these cases, expansion of the legal
obligations between those involved in such a relationship actually
realizes their intention. On the other hand, in regard to universal
cohabitants, their choice of lifestyle reflects, in general, a decision not to
marry, rather than just a rejection of religious marriage. Therefore, in
such cases, those liberal considerations against imposing marriage law on
cohabitants ought to have an influence on Israeli law.
While the liberal analysis calls on Israeli law to distinguish between
those unable to wed and regular cohabitants and between universal and
Israeli cohabitants, Israeli courts do not draw a distinction.
Consequently, they apply marital obligations to all cohabitants and not
only those unable to wed.80 It seems that at a certain juncture, Israeli law
ignores instances in which a person could marry, but chooses not to do
so, despite the fact that this choice could reflect the essential difference
of that person‘s spousal relations from those of a married couple.
Moreover, a number of recent decisions have made it clear that a
significant portion of the law applying to cohabitants have become a
cognitive issue that is not subject to the parties‘ stipulation.81 For
example, in Bar-Nahor v. Estate of Osterlitz,82 which presents one of the
most troubling cases from a liberal perspective, the court imposed
marital obligations on cohabitants despite an explicit agreement between
the parties in which they declared that they were not interested in being
deemed cohabitants.83 In this case Mr. Bar-Nahor and Ms. Ostterlitz
agreed before they began to live together regarding their financial

79. See, e.g., Vered Baloush-Kleinman & Shlomo Sharlin, Social, Economic, and Attitudinal
Characteristics of Cohabitation in Israel, 25 J. OF FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 255 (2004) (sociological
study that demonstrates that in most cases the choice was not in favor of an alternative to marriage,
but to a connection preceding marriage).
80. For a comprehensive analysis of Israeli verdicts that demonstrate the disregard of the
courts from the easy option to screen between universal cohabitant and Israeli-made cohabitant, see
LIFSHITZ, COHABITATION LAW, supra note 11, at 101–20.
81. See, e.g., CA 1717/98 Blau v. Pozesh [2000] IsrSC 54(4) 376 (rulings).
82. CA 7021/93 Bar-Nahor v. Estate of Osterlitz [1994] Tak-El 94(3) 1512.
83. See my critique at LIFSHITZ, COHABITATION LAW, supra note 11, at 112–20.
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arrangements. Their agreement explicitly stated that, beyond their
arrangement, they do not want to be considered cohabitants under the
law. After almost 3 years of living together, Bar-Nahor passed away, and
Osterlitz sued the estate for alimony, to which she was entitled as a
cohabitant, according to Israeli law. The heirs claimed, however, that the
couple explicitly claimed that they did not want to be considered
cohabitants. The Israeli Supreme Court held that, despite their explicit
agreement, the partners lived as cohabitants and thus should legally be
considered as such. The court further argued that, as cohabitants, the
partners were not allowed to waive legal rights, such as alimony from the
estate, that a married person is not entitled to forgo. Thus, the court held
that Ostterlitz is entitled to alimony from the estate.
There are rare instances in which it would be appropriate for courts
to treat a couple as cohabitants, notwithstanding any agreement to the
contrary. First, sensitivity to power imbalances of certain cohabitants
should lead to greater use of those tools available in contract law that
protect disadvantaged parties (such as laws relating to mistake, good
faith, duress, unconscionability, and the like).84 A second instance where
intervention is appropriate relates to the issue of children. (Furthermore,
even agreements which ostensibly focus on spousal relations still need to
be examined from a perspective that takes into account the welfare of the
children.) Finally, given the dynamic nature of spousal relations, there
may be situations in which the original agreement between the parties no
longer reflects their actual lifestyle. In such instances it would sometimes
be appropriate to deviate from the original, formal arrangement.
A careful examination of the ruling shows that in Bar-Nahor none of
these justifications existed.
First, the Bar-Nahor case is not a typical instance in which the
characteristic discrepancies of power between men and women arise.
Both parties were adults, both had experience in spousal relations, and
both had independent sources of income. The agreement between them
84. Indeed, the Family Court in Ramat Gan Family Case (J-m) 10681/98 Anon v. Anon, TakMish 3 (2002) 13 dealt with such a case. The case dealt with a couple who lived together for almost
20 years, and who even had children together. During the course of the relationship, the woman
developed a clear economic dependence on her partner. Contrary to the case of Bar-Nahor v. Estate
of Osterlitz, where the agreement between the parties was entered into at the beginning of the
relationship, the man demanded that the woman sign a draconian agreement negating her rights after
12 years of living together and after a clear dependence had already been created. CA 7021/93 BarNahor v. Estate of Osterlitz [1994] Tak-El 94(3) 1512. American readers might remember the
famous ruling in Wilcox v. Trautz where following the contractual model it was held that the
agreement was valid. 963 N.E. 2d 141 (Mass. 1998). Contrary to this, in Anon. v. Anon., the court
negated the agreement and this was confirmed by the District Court. (J-m) 10681/98 Anon v. Anon,
Tak-Mish 3 (2002) 13. It seems to me that in the circumstances of both judgments, the ruling in
Anon. v. Anon. has greater justification and it illustrates the difficulty of complete reliance on the
contractual model.
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was made at an early stage in their relationship; thus, one cannot speak of
any dependence that was exploited by any of the parties. In general, the
ruling does not suggest that one of the parties initiated the agreement
while the other objected to it or was coerced into signing it. Second, it
does not appear that the agreement made between the two partners was
inequitable or unbalanced. Within the framework of the agreement, the
couple purchased an apartment that was registered in both their names.
As noted above, both were mature adults with independent economic
resources and incomes, and they sought to maintain both personal
independence and independence of assets. In this framework, they kept
their respective assets separate (except for the apartment), and
established an agreed-upon mechanism for quickly breaking off the
relationship at the request of either party. They also sought to avoid
creating economic obligations between their heirs and any surviving
partner. Can one view this as a one-sided, exploitative arrangement?
Third, they had no children in common during the course of the
relationship. Accordingly, one cannot justify intervention in the contract
in the interests of the children.
On a superficial level, one might attempt to justify the Bar-Nahor
decision based on the dynamic relationship rationale. According to this
rationale, even if the express agreement described a relationship that did
not take the form of cohabitation, the later lifestyle of the parties
indicated that they had abandoned their original written agreement, and
lived as cohabitants. Therefore, if one believes that in the case of long
term relationships, the original framework is no longer paramount, one
may feel that the ruling in this case is justified. However, if one looks
more closely at the case, one will see that the dynamic relationship
rationale cannot justify the court‘s ruling.
The dynamic relationship rationale is based on the understanding that
in long-term relationships, particularly in relationships of an intimate
nature, the parties involved often deviate from their original plans, and
these deviations may not necessarily be formalized in a new agreement.
On the other hand, in the Bar-Nahor case, the two parties kept entirely to
their original plan. They knew that the lifestyle they had chosen might be
considered cohabitation from a legal point of view, and therefore
indicated from the outset that they were not interested in that status.
Accordingly, the decision of the court in Bar-Nahor should not be seen
as a modification of the agreement between the parties based on
changing circumstances, but rather as a blatant intervention in their
original and ongoing understanding.
In summary, then, the Bar-Nahor case does not reflect a
sophisticated protection against flaws in intent, an intervention in an
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inequitable arrangement, a consideration of the interests of children, or a
modification of a long-term agreement to conform to changing
circumstances. There is no escaping the conclusion that at the heart of
the decision is the perception that, as with legal marriage, so too
sociological marriage involves certain kinds of commitments that are not
subject to stipulation by the parties. As explained earlier, this kind of
comparison is very problematic from a liberal perspective.
C. The Non-Liberal Trend of Cohabitation Law in the United States
Non-liberal trends similar to those existing in Israel have begun to
take hold in the United States as well. Since the 1980s, American courts
have imposed marital obligations on cohabitants.85 Influenced by the
famous ruling in Marvin v. Marvin,86 courts applied marital law to
cohabitants based on an implicit contract theory that focuses on the intent
of the parties.87 Recently, however, the American Law Institute (ALI)
completed an ambitious project, designed to formulate new principles for
regulating the economic outcomes of family separations.88 One of the
chapters in the project dealt with the regulation of economic outcomes of
cohabitant separation.89
The ALI absolutely abandons the Marvin rule, and the contractual
test established therein.90 Instead, the ALI establishes a series of criteria
relating to the sociological and psychological components of marital ties.
If these conditions are fulfilled, then the couple may be treated as
members of a domestic partnership.91 From this starting point, the ALI

85. It is difficult to place all the American case law dealing with cohabitants in one class.
Indeed, alongside cases willing to accord relatively broad recognition to the rights of cohabitants,
there are also judgments which require an express agreement as a precondition for such recognition.
In addition, in the United States there is still a view which negates agreements between cohabitants
for reasons of public policy. At the same time, at least until recently, the dominant approach in the
United States was the contractual one, which recognized cohabitants‘ rights only when these were
based on express or implied agreements. For the classification of the various judicial rulings in the
United States in relation to this issue, see Frances Olsen, Asset Distribution After Unmarried
Cohabitation: A United States Perspective, in DIVIDING THE ASSETS ON FAMILY BREAKDOWN 89
(Rebecca B. Harris ed., 1998), see also Sanford N. Katz, Marriage as Partnership, 73 NOTRE DAME
L. Rev. 1251, 1263–68 (1998).
86. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1996).
87. See supra note 85. There were however some cases previous to the ALI which acted
according to the status model, see, e.g., the ruling of the Washington court in In re Marriage of
Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328 (Wash. 1984). Notwithstanding that this ruling is not representative, it is
possible to point to a number of additional judgments. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 43, at 1293–
95.
88. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 43.
89. Id. at ch. 6.
90. Id. at 918–19.
91. Id. at para. 6.03. According to this provision, domestic partners are two people who are

359]

A POTENTIAL LESSON

379

applies marriage law to domestic partners,92 while at the same time
making it easier for a person living with a partner to prove that their
relationship falls into the category of domestic partnership.93 In addition,
the ALI makes it clear that domestic partners who are not interested in
the application of spousal law to their relationship will be required to
agree to this explicitly and that such agreement may be subject to strict
judicial review.94 The combination of these legal doctrines may indicate
that the regulation of the relations between cohabitants is shifting from a
contractual model to one of status.95
The acceptance of these principles is likely to result in rulings like
the Bar-Nahor case in Israel, 96 in which the obligations of marriage will
be imposed on the couple, in opposition to their explicit wishes. For the
couple, the outcome is an effective ―marriage against their will.‖97 One
can hardly ignore the irony of the situation: liberal motivation leads, in
the end, to a paternalistic result.

not married to each other, who have shared a joint residential home and have lived as a couple for a
significant period of time. The provision proceeds by establishing a long line of criteria which clarify
what is regarded as life as a couple. These criteria include, inter alia, life together for a period to be
determined, a lifestyle which recalls a lifestyle characteristic of married couples, the existence of
economic dependence between the couple, the existence of joint children, declarations by the parties
concerning the nature of their relationship inter se and between themselves and others and additional
criteria relating to the substance of the connection between the parties.
92. See id. at para. 6.02.
93. See id. at para. 6.03, sub-para. 3, which provides that living together under one roof for a
period to be determined by state law creates a rebuttable presumption that the parties lived as a
couple.
94. See id. at para. 6.03, sub-para. 2, which refers to such an agreement and applies the
provisions of Chapter 7 of the ALI which deals with conditions for enforcing agreements between
married couples. The criteria established in Chapter 7 for the recognition of agreements are
relatively strict compared to customary conditions in ordinary contract law. See AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, supra note 43, at 908–09, 915. For criticism of the application of these rules to
agreements between cohabitants and reference to cases in which the strict nature of Chapter 7 will
severely hamper cohabitants wishing to enter into a valid contract that negates the application of
spousal laws to their relationship, see also Westfall, supra note 54, at 1479.
95. For a similar characterization of the new trends, see Blumberg, supra note 43, at 1294–
95; Ellman, supra note 59. See also Lynne Marie Kohm, How Will the Proliferation and Recognition
of Domestic Partnerships Affect Marriage?, 4 J. L. FAM. STUD. 105 (2002) (criticizing this process);
Regan, supra note 62, at 1451; Scott, Domestic Partnerships, supra note 58 (on one hand supporting
equating marriage and cohabitation, but on the other hand rejecting the status model and preferring
the basis of relational contract model. Scott therefore is more open to explicit private ordering which
opposes marriage law.); Westfall, supra note 54, at 1476.
96. See supra note 81.
97. See Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? A Liberal Analysis of Cohabitation
Law, 25 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 741 (2002) (Isr.).
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IV. ON BEHALF OF DEMOCRATIC COMPROMISE
This Part demonstrates the outcome of the two previous critiques,
both of the conservatives and of the liberals. This Part will argue on
behalf of democratic compromises such as civil unions which already
exist in several states in the United States98 as well as other countries,99
and the spousal registry which is currently discussed in Israel.100 Such
arrangements are based on the distinction between the symbolic
dimension of the label ―marriage‖ and the civil rights that it imparts.
According to these arrangements, the symbolic title of ―marriage‖
will be reserved for traditional marriage (religious marriages in Israel,
and opposite-sex marriages in the United States). Along with this, an
alternative civil institution for marriage is being established,101 in which
same-sex couples as well as other couples will be able to register as
spouses and receive all the civil rights enjoyed by married spouses, in all
aspects but name.102
Such arrangements have advantages, from both liberal and
conservative perspectives. From the liberal perspective, these proposals
will, for the first time, give the rights of married individuals to those
who, until now, were barred from marrying. Furthermore, even on the
symbolic level, these arrangements grant spousal recognition, albeit not
as a married couple, to couples prevented from marrying by the current
law. Another advantage of the proposal is that it is intended for the entire
population, and therefore is not a track for the ―rejected.‖ It could be
argued that a large portion of the proposal‘s civil advantages are already
attained at present, by means of the cohabitation laws. However, the
spousal registry and civil unions have considerable advantages over the
recognition of cohabitants‘ rights. First, the prior registration of the
parties spares the couple from the need to prove their cohabitation status.
These couples will not need to engage in litigation with third parties,
such as government authorities, in order to realize their rights.
Additionally, due to its institutionalized nature and its ex-ante
characteristic, prior registration provides higher public recognition than
98. In the U.S. so far (until Nov. 1, 2007), California, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Vermont
have valid civil union acts or quasi regime. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (2005); 2005 CONN. LEGIS.
SERV. No. 05-10 (West); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-1 (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201–
07 (2000); see also Wardle, supra note 42, at Appendix II (detailed survey).
99. See Wardle, supra note 42.
100. See LIFSHITZ, supra note 14.
101. While in the U.S., these alternatives already exist, in Israel, they have not been
established yet.
102. There are, however, some states in the U.S., as well as in other countries, that have
extended limited economic rights to domestic partners. See Wardle, supra note 42, at Appendix III
(survey).

359]

A POTENTIAL LESSON

381

that afforded to cohabitants ex-post. Furthermore, the establishment of a
spousal registry/civil union will enable a filtering mechanism among
those prevented from marrying. It will enable differentiation between
those who want to assume marriage law (including its inherent
obligations) and those who, even if permitted to marry, would prefer to
live in a non-institutionalized relationship. Consequently, applying
marriage law only to those registered as spouses will prevent the
imposition of marriage obligations on unwilling partners.
The advantages of such an arrangement from a conservative
viewpoint are equally obvious. First, this preserves the monopoly of the
label ―marriage‖ for traditional religious marriages (in Israel) and
opposite-sex marriages (in the United States). Second, these
arrangements distinguish between non-institutionalized and nonbinding
ties, such as cohabitation, and institutionalized relationships that express
commitment, such as civil union. Finally, these arrangements remove a
good deal of the justifications for blurring the distinction between
marriage and cohabitation and for the general weakening of marriage.
It must be admitted, however, that such a compromise arrangement
has its price and shortcomings. From a conservative perspective, the
waiving of the status quo in itself always raises the fear of a slippery
slope in which civil union will slide into civil marriage in every aspect. A
liberal point of view calls for the establishment of civil marriage in its
full sense. Consequently, the forgoing of such possibility is
problematic.103 Notwithstanding, when one considers the advantages of
the spousal registry and civil unions, on the one hand, and the
disadvantages of the status quo, on the other, the spousal registry in
Israel and the civil union in the United States reflect a fitting democratic
compromise.
V. CONCLUSION
Marriage is one of the basic institutions of society, tradition, and
personal life. The importance of marriage to tradition and society leads
conservatives, religious as well as secular, to oppose any significant
changes in the features of marriage. At the same time, the importance of
marriage leads liberals to oppose the exclusion from marriage of samesex couples as well as other groups, and to reject civil union as a
substitute to marriage.
103. For the liberal case against civil union as substitute to marriage, see RONALD DWORKIN,
IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?: PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL DEBATE 86–89 (2006) and
YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF GAY
PARTNERSHIP IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (Princeton University Press 2002).
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This Comment offers three insights regarding this dispute: First, it
uses the Israeli experience to demonstrate the severe result, for
conservatives, of the conservative opposition to same-sex marriage. It
shows that the price of excluding from marriage same-sex couples and
other groups might diminish the importance of marriage and its
traditional privileges, which would, in turn, result in the equating of
marriage and cohabitation. Second, it indicates the liberal danger of the
so-called liberal equation of marriage and cohabitation. Finally, this
Comment supports civil unions and spousal registry as tolerable
democratic compromises between the conservative and liberal positions.

